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Abstract  
Still very divided, but taking advantage of the gradual return to democracy, Latin American governments 
are trying to come together to deal with  globalisation. The Southern Common Market (Mercosur) 
appears to be the most promising of all these sub-regional groupings, as it is banking on a customs union 
and political cooperation inspired by the European model. The European Union offered its support and an 
economic and political partnership. George W. Bush has revived the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA), but the US Congress remains divided on the subject, notably because of the breakthrough made 
by Mexico through NAFTA. Finally, the new round of the World Trade Organization (WTO), launched in 
Doha, could blur the outcome. In any case, the rivalry between the United States and the European 
Union will be at the forefront for the next few years.  
Latin America and the Caribbean have a total population of about 4801 million people with a GDP of 
about $1.5 trillion: the European Union (EU), with 15 members, has 380 million inhabitants and a GDP of 
$7,500 billion. With the planned enlargement to the east, it will reach 480 million inhabitants by 2010. 
Faced with this increasingly structured and integrated Union - even if the final form remains to be 
defined - Latin America remains divided and heterogeneous. It has 78 million people living below the 
poverty line. The borders of its states are a legacy of the colonial past. Wars of independence, coups 
d'état, dictatorships, then the gradual return to democracy have shaped nationalisms and rivalries. The 
recent border dispute between Peru and Ecuador is the latest example. Indigenous Indian populations 
are hardly assimilated and live mostly in poverty. The Iberian languages and the Catholic religion are 
precious cement for all these peoples.  
The economies of these countries have vast natural resources, a formidable reservoir of agricultural 
production, large pockets of underemployment, but also a competitive industrialisation deficit. 
Successive governments have realised that they must act together if they want to keep pace with the 
internationalisation of the global economy. The World Trade Organization (WTO) provides an effective 
forum for advocating for trade liberalisation and sustainable development. However, they focus 
primarily on very diversified sub-regional groupings, which may take the form of a customs union in the 
long term, such as the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), integration into North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for Mexico and perhaps soon for Chile, free trade zones for the Andean 
Group countries and the Central American Union or the Caribbean (CARICOM).  
The European Union represents for these countries a fascinating experience of regional cooperation, 
progressive integration and a single currency, accompanied by respect for the national sovereignty, 
identities, cultures and traditions of its member states.  It is therefore not surprising that sub-regional 
groupings in Latin America are drawing on the European example and are trying to forge strong links 
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with the EU, which offers them a genuine economic, cultural and political partnership and not just a free 
trade area compatible with WTO rules.  
President George Bush Senior launched the idea of a free trade zone from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. Bill 
Clinton had taken up the idea after the summit of heads of state in Miami, then he was discouraged by 
financial crises, political instability in Latin America and attempts at sub-regional groupings. George W. 
Bush has taken the initiative of this Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) through a series of bilateral 
agreements between the United States and the Latin American countries. Chile has already accepted the 
project, this extension of NAFTA integrating Mexico, and Argentina, now bankrupt, was very tempted. 
Paradoxically, the United States and the EU have embarked on both a new round of multilateral 
negotiations at the WTO and in seeking partnerships with Latin American countries, individually or in 
sub-regional groups, the most promising is certainly Mercosur.  
With some 100 million inhabitants, Mexico is, after Brazil, the second largest power in Latin America. 
With  $4,500 in GDP per capita and $170 billion in debt, or 35% of GDP - it has gradually become an 
emerging country whose economy is increasingly tied to the American and Canadian economies under 
NAFTA, effective since January 1, 1994, with the support of the Clinton Administration.  
The distribution of employment between the different sectors is as follows:  
- agriculture: 23%, 6% of GDP;  
- industry: 23%, 26% of GDP;  
- services: 54%, 68% of GDP.  
In its desire to accelerate the shift from a centralised, but counterproductive, state-led model of 
development to an open, foreign-oriented, private business-driven model of economy, the Mexican 
government has multiplied initiatives: participation in GATT in 1986, co-founding of the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, joining the Standing Committee on Economic Cooperation for Asia 
and the Pacific (APEC), signing free trade agreements  with Central American countries (Venezuela, 
Chile, Bolivia, Colombia) and with member countries of the Latin American Integration Association), 
participation in the Rio Group has established permanent consultation mechanisms between 19 Latin 
American countries, joining the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 
1994.  
The two decisive stages were, of course, entry into NAFTA in 1994 and, in counterbalance, the signing on 
8 December 1997, in Brussels, of a cooperation agreement with the European Union, entered into force 
on 1 October 2000. This openness to the economies of developed countries and the deregulation that 
accompanied it did not go smoothly. In 1994, the financial crisis shook the country: devaluation of 15% 
of the peso, followed by a depreciation of nearly 60% in a few days; a new austerity plan with higher 
taxes, electricity and gas prices; a severe recession in 1995 with a 6.2% drop in GDP. Mexico owed its 
salvation only to external intervention: President Clinton mobilized the IMF, the World Bank and the 
developed countries to provide massive aid of $50 billion, thus succeeding in curbing the financial crisis.  
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After many uprisings and revolutions, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) ruled the country alone 
between 1924 and 2000. That year, on 2 July, Vicente Fox, leader of the National Action Party, was 
elected president. He faces all kinds of challenges. The population is growing at a rate of 1.6% per year, 
and unemployment, incalculable in non-urban areas, is very high. 35% of the population is under 15, 
46% of Mexicans live below the poverty line and 20% in poverty. As a result, some 300,000 Mexicans 
attempt each year to cross the border with the United States. The new government will have to improve 
education (10% of the population is illiterate), lower the level of pollution - unbearable in Mexico City - 
and fight monopolies, corruption, drugs, fraud and crime.  
Its best asset is still NAFTA, the big free trade zone with its two big industrialised neighbours tothe 
North: the United States and Canada. In total, more than 400 million consumer but the realisation of this 
area is far from complete, particularly in the field of services and the movement of people. Since 1994, 
Mexico has benefited greatly from NAFTA: it has become the 13th largest economy in the world, the 8th 
largest exporter (3% of the world total) and the 4th largest oil producer. The United States now accounts 
for 83% of Mexican exports and Canada 5.2%. As a result, Europe has largely lost this market, and Spain, 
for example, absorbs only 1% of Mexican exports. But President Fox wants to go even further: he calls 
for the free movement of people and services (Mexican trucks still cannot penetrate more than 30 km 
inside US territory) and the creation of a monetary union. If we can imagine the US dollar as the single 
currency for the entire North American continent, the reaction of the Central Bank of Canada was quick: 
it felt that a floating exchange rate system, allowing a more flexible response to external shocks such as 
the oil crises or the recent crises in Asia, was better for Canada.  
Mexico quickly realised that it could be dangerous for its sovereignty to depend too much on the United 
States. The loss of half of its territory in the mid-nineteenth century (Texas, California, Arizona and New 
Mexico) probably continues to fuel some aggression against gringos. The offer of wide-ranging 
cooperation by the European Union since 1991 has been seized. It has not been easy, especially within 
the EU, to develop the scope of the future agreement. It came into effect on October 1, 2000 and will 
establish a six-year free trade area for goods and services. Despite the success of NAFTA, Europe has 
maintained some strong positions: it exports to Mexico in 1999 were worth 10.1 billion euros and 
imports only 4.4 billion, a positive balance of 5.7%. Under the agreement, the Union will have to fully 
liberalise imports of industrial products by 2003, and Mexico in 2007. Mexico will also have to provide 
Europeans with access to government services and purchases equivalent to that accorded to its US and 
Canadian partners in NAFTA.  
During this six-year period (2001-2007), the Union will provide assistance of 56 million euros for 
cooperation in the institutional areas, development of law of the State, science, technology , education 
and culture. Common institutions have been created: a Joint Council at ministerial level, a Joint 
Committee at the administrative level, and various specialised committees. In the framework of the 
political dialogue, the ministers discussed together the reform of the United Nations, the peacekeeping 
operations and the situation in Latin America.  
Inspired by the European example, four countries created a customs union in 1991: Brazil, Argentina, 
Uruguay and Paraguay; a giant (GDP of $743 billion), a medium (GDP of $282 billion) and two small (GDP 
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of 8 and 20 billion dollars), with very different levels of development. In total, this area represents a GDP 
of $1 trillion for a population of 210 million. Mercosur accounts for 76% of South America's GDP, 67% of 
its industrial output and 62% of its population. Their common market is expected to be completed in 
2006, barring any obstacles, such as the current Argentine economic and financial crisis. Mercosur is the 
third largest trading block in the world after the EU and NAFTA. Europe was naturally interested from 
the beginning in these emulators of European integration and regional supranationalism.  
This attention is certainly not entirely disinterested, since the Union is Mercosur's main trading partner 
(36% of its exports and 32% of its imports), ahead of the United States (27% of its imports) and Japan 
(7%). An interregional cooperation agreement was signed at the end of 1995, but it will take four years 
of long negotiations - largely internal on both sides - to officially launch on 28 June 1999, in Rio de 
Janeiro, the real negotiation for free trade agreement between two customs unions: the ultimate goal 
was set to 2005, before or simultaneously with the completion of the FTAA The US Administration is 
working hard to achieve the FTAA during President Bush's tenure. To avoid the domination of the big 
northern neighbour, Mercosur member countries want to deepen their customs union and political 
cooperation and find a counterweight to the United States by joining forces with the Union.  
However, the two customs unions are very dissimilar: 380 million inhabitants in the Union and a GDP of 
8000 billion euros, against 210 million inhabitants for Mercosur and a GDP of 1000 billion euros . And 
yet, Brazil's GDP is almost equivalent to that of China and twice that of India. But the difference in 
development is even more apparent with GDP per capita: 5,000 euros for Mercosur, against 20,000 for 
the Union. The Mercosur institutions are an embryo of a supranational system: a Council of Ministers, a 
Committee of Ambassadors, a Trade Commission, Technical Committees, a rotation of the Presidency 
every six months, a joint secretariat, an Economic and Social Committee, and finally a joint mini-
parliament composed of 16 members from each of the four national parliaments: this is a bit like the 
European institutions, but without experience, the  acquis communitaire and, above all, majority voting, 
even qualified: as any Mercosur decision is taken by intergovernmental consensus.  
Mercosur's common external tariff will not be finalised until 2006. The industrial tariffs are 29.4% on 
average in Brazil and 30.6% in Argentina, and the agricultural tariffs are respectively 35.3% and 32.8%. 
%. For the Union, they are 4.1% in industry and 19.5% in agriculture. In addition, non-tariff barriers are 
much higher in Mercosur. Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil want agricultural concessions from Europe in 
exchange for opening industrially. The negotiation between the two ‘unions’ is therefore asymmetrical 
in its commercial stakes and arduous in its development.  
The agricultural question is crucial for Europe, which must at the same time face enlargement to the 
east towards countries with a high agricultural potential (Poland, Hungary, etc.), under pressure from 
major agricultural producers and exporters (the United States and the Cairns Group), the new round of 
negotiations at the WTO (commitments made at the end of the Uruguay Round and in Doha), the 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (less guaranteed producer prices and more subsidies for 
disadvantaged farmers) and, lastly, the development of Community budgets after 2006 (an exercise that 
could not be more difficult if we want to safeguard the principle of solidarity between rich regions and 
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poor regions after the entry of new Member States 4 to 5 times poorer than the current average of the 
Fifteen).  
The stakes of this inter-regional negotiation are absolutely clear and important for industry - the major 
European groups have already established subsidiaries in Brazil or Argentina - and for services, in 
particular transport, banking, insurance, telecommunications and energy. To be successful, the 
negotiators involved will have to make trade-offs in agriculture, which is essential for Mercosur and for 
the WTO (Article XXIV of the GATT). The agreement should include, in essence, all trade between the 
parties. The key to success will lie in the well-understood interest of agri-food trade, with Europeans 
increasingly specialising in the production and export of quality food products with high added value.  
In addition, European agribusiness firms are investing in Mercosur to export to third markets in Latin 
America and North America, especially if the FTAA is to open these markets in the near future. A 
possible negotiating tactic could be that of progress in stages, in order to keep pace with possible 
developments in the WTO, and especially with those in the FTAA. Indeed, we must rely on the activism 
of the Bush Administration not to be overtaken by Europeans in countries that the United States has 
always considered as their reserved stronghold. Mercosur’s ambition has no geographic boundaries, as 
they also aim for free trade agreements with South Africa and the countries of the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA).  
In some areas, the negotiations between the EU and Mercosur are fairly advanced: texts are already 
circulating between the two delegations, notably on the future common institutions (Association 
Council, Parliamentary Association Committee, relations with society civil society) and the different 
types of cooperation envisaged (statistics, agriculture, customs, competition, but also the fight against 
drugs and organised crime). However, with rotating presidencies every six months, negotiation is not 
easy; only the European Commission can be the permanent interlocutor likely to present the necessary 
compromises. On Mercosur’s side, the weak link is now Argentina.  
With 36.5 million inhabitants and a per capita GDP of $7,600, it has been in recession for three years. 
Unemployment is 20% of the active population, the public debt is $142 billion, and the contraction of 
the economy could rise to 12% in 2002. Nevertheless, the government clung to unit parity with the 
dollar that had some success under Carlos Menem. To survive, the De La Rua government borrowed on 
the market at three months at a rate of 15%, while the rate was about 5% in the United States. The new 
Duhalde government has abandoned the dollar parity and is in default. In 2000, however, Argentina 
obtained an international support plan of $40 billion. To borrow again $10 billion, it will have to accept 
the conditions of the IMF, including, in particular, a strengthened fiscal austerity and a reduction of the 
public expenditure of the provinces, with the reduction of the wages of the civil servants and the 
suppression of the twenty or so ‘fake currencies’ that circulate there.  
But popular discontent is growing, the unemployed are taking to the streets, and political disarray is 
growing. As a result, Argentina is also in no hurry to advance negotiations with the Union and continues 
to turn its hopes towards the United States, the only ones able to bail out its currency and prevent 
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economic disaster. Argentina would therefore be ready to accept the FTAA later, while hoping to stay in 
Mercosur. But President Bush does not seem to want to help a distant and mismanaged country.  
The 14.9 million Chileans have a per capita GDP of $4,700, a figure very close to that of the Mercosur 
average ($5,000). And the country has recorded economic growth of 4 to 5% per year over the past ten 
years. However, the deceleration of the US economy and the crisis in Argentina have affected Chilean 
prices and production. Unemployment has risen to more than 8%, inflation remains under control at 
3.5% and the Central Bank has lowered its central rate to 3.75% following successive rate cuts in the 
United States. For a Latin American country, fiscal discipline remains a model of its kind, with a budget 
surplus of 1%. Perhaps this fiscal austerity partly explains the high rate of unemployment in a healthy 
and growing economy.  
After many trials, Chilean democracy is getting stronger. President Lagos has extended and consolidated 
freedoms (abolition of the death penalty), reform of the health system and judicial reform. Supporting 
indigenous peoples and SMEs, he encouraged the penetration of information technology and capital 
market reform to attract ever more foreign investment, and launched a $3.5 billion major works 
programme (roads, metro, airports and ports). Debt reaches $37 billion, or about 50% of GDP, which is 
quite reasonable since it is 85% private debt and 80% long-term debt. The Union is now Chile's main 
trading partner, absorbing more than 26% of exports and accounting for 18% of the country's total 
imports; these flows leave Chile a surplus of $2 billion a year in its trade balance with Europe. This small 
country finally has monetary reserves of more than 14 billion dollars.  
This promising economic environment allows Chile to multiply bilateral agreements of all-out 
liberalisation by applying for Mercosur membership, while negotiating with the United States under the 
FTAA and attempting to strengthen its cooperation agreement with the European Union. The objective 
is to establish a WTO-compatible free trade area alongside the agreement with Mercosur. Needless to 
say, the Chileans stand firmly within the WTO in the camp of active multilateralists, while at the same 
time advancing on the path of regional integration (Mercosur, FTAA) and bilateralism (with Europe) .  
The integration of the entire southern cone, Mercosur and Chile, is of utmost interest to Europe, which 
aims to foster the development of an integrated regional unit, which serves as a counterweight to the 
US Alaska to Tierra del Fuego free trade zone.  
The countries - Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela - formed in the 1970s the first regional grouping 
in Latin America. The most original idea was to select in advance the different sectors of industrial 
activity that each member country would develop and to open the borders to the industrial products 
thus produced. The reaction of the European Economic Community has been to provide technical, 
financial and commercial assistance (through the establishment of the Generalised System of 
Preferences) to this first sub-regional group, trying to pool the limited resources of these four less 
developed countries. The original initiative has, unfortunately, been a meagre success. Bolivia, with a 
GDP of US $1,000 per capita, has remained the poorest country in Latin America, while Venezuela, rich 
in oil, has become an influential member of OPEC and accounts for over 90% exports of petroleum 
products.  
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The first regional cooperation agreement between Europe and the Andean Group was signed in 1983, it 
expanded the field of cooperation between the two regional entities. It was followed by a regional 
framework agreement in 1993, which entered into force only in 1998, following the Madrid European 
Council of 1995. This agreement created common institutions: a Joint Committee which meets every 
two years and two subcommittees meeting annually, the first on trade and industry, the second on 
science and technology.  
Trade relations between the two groups are growing slowly (by 25% between 1990 and 1999). They 
account for 16.7% of total Andean exports and consist mainly of basic or low-level products. 75% of 
these products enter the Union free of customs duties, in particular under the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP), open to all developing countries, with a special regime for the poorest of them, 
including Bolivia). European exports to the Andean Group represent only 0.8% of total Union exports 
and 85% of manufactured goods. In 1999, trade between the two groups reached 12 billion euros. 
Remember that the GSP will probably be improved by the EU from 2002, certainly for the benefit of the 
poorest countries on the planet.  
A political dialogue on the drug issue led both parties in March 2000 to sign agreements on precursor 
chemicals imported from Europe by the Andean countries for the production of drugs. A first seminar on 
the harmonisation of Andean legislation in the fight against drugs was held in Lisbon in October 2000. 
The Union also intervened as pacifier during the border war between Peru and Ecuador: to support the 
peace agreement between the belligerents, it decided in 2000 to build a road across the border of the 
two countries. Europe is studying two new regional initiatives: the first on the prevention of natural 
disasters and the second on air safety.  
To top it off, the EU and Andean Group Ministers, meeting in Vilamoura on 24 February 2000, asked the 
European Commission and the General Secretariat of the Group to jointly prepare a state of play of their 
relations and to make proposals to develop trade relations between the two regions, in parallel with the 
progress made in the political dialogue. But it seems likely that the Union will favour links with Mercosur 
and Chile, merely continuing to grant ‘generalised tariff preferences’ to the Andean Group countries for 
another 5 to 10 years. The situation of civil war in Colombia, the political disorders in Peru and now in 
Venezuela do not encourage the creation of interregional institutional links.  
Relations between Europe and the Central American countries have developed during the Esquipulas 
peace process, with the support of the Contodara Group, to put an end to civil wars that tore apart El 
Salvador and Nicaragua. The Ministers of both groups met in San José, Costa Rica, in 1984, to concretise 
the EEC's support for a negotiated solution to Central American conflicts. Humanitarian aid has been 
provided by Europeans to the populations affected by these wars. This political dialogue has been so 
successful that it has become biennial at the ministerial level, with a meeting at the ministerial troika 
level of the EU in the intervening years. At the San José XII Ministerial Conference in Florence in May 
1996, two priority areas were set for European cooperation in Central America: the consolidation of the 
rule of law in the region, and the modernisation of public administrations to enable these countries to 
continue their regional integration. These priorities were embodied in a framework cooperation 
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agreement between the two regional groups, which came into force on 1 March 1999, with the main 
objectives of democratisation and economic integration.  
The region was devastated by Hurricane Mitch: at least 10,000 dead or missing, and immense material 
damage estimated at 4.8 billion euros. Faced with this disaster, international aid was mobilised. The 
Union intervened with emergency aid worth €300 million through the European Commission 
Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and European NGOs. Then, a regional programme for reconstruction in 
Central America has been launched with the objective of helping the four most countries 
affected:  Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. Aid will be concentrated on key sectors: 
rehabilitation of water supply and sewerage, improvement of sanitary capacities (supply of equipment 
and vaccines, fight against epidemics), reconstruction of houses and schools, training of teachers and 
health personnel. The next San José Conferences will regularly review the progress of this programme 
and the Framework Cooperation Agreement. The Union, faithful to its action in favour of sub-regional 
organisations, has clearly indicated that it supports the process of Central American integration as well 
as the progressive - but slow - evolution of the countries of the Isthmus towards a true union.  
As early as 1973, the Caribbean States established between them a Community, CARICOM, with the 
objectives of promoting their geographical integration, coordinating their views on external relations 
and developing common service such as inter-island navigation, health, education and women's issues. 
It should be noted that these many economies, islands and with little diversity, are particularly 
vulnerable individually. The Caribbean therefore felt very early a vital need to create between them a 
sort of common market in the image of Europe.  
GDP per capita may seem quite high, $4,500, but that is mainly due to tourism receipts. The disparity 
between the Caribbean is very high if we consider the GDP per capita of the poorest of them (private 
tourism), Haiti, or 250 dollars.  
Relations between the European Union and the Caribbean are essentially based on the Lomé 
Convention. Fifteen independent countries have signed Lomé IV since 1989: Antigua and Barbuda, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Saint - Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. Cuba, the 
last Marxist dictatorship in the region, has chosen to be an observer. To replace the Lomé IV 
Convention, the ACP countries and therefore the Caribbean have negotiated with the Union a new 
cooperation agreement and partnership with more compatible rules the WTO, which was concluded in 
February 2000 and signed on 23 June 2000. Under this agreement, the Caribbean enjoys wide trade 
preferences, particularly for sugar, bananas, rice and rum as the EU constitutes their main export 
market. In 1997, Europeans imported $3.1 billion from the Caribbean and exported $3.8 billion to the 
Caribbean. European economic interests are concentrated in certain sectors: tourism, services and 
exports of processed industrial and agricultural products.  
The Caribbean States participate in the political dialogue with Europe in the common institutions with 
the ACP: the Council of Ministers and the Joint Parliamentary Assembly. But there is also political 
dialogue at the regional level, in a specific cooperation body, the CARIFORUM. Interdepartmental 
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meetings are held every year. Cooperation covers democratisation processes, respect for human rights, 
the fight against organised crime and illicit drug trafficking, good governance and conflict prevention.  
There is no doubt that these special relations with Europe offer the Caribbean States a source of 
diversification of their commercial, economic, financial and political relations, and thus an effective 
counterweight to North American hegemony. The Union is also, with the Inter-American Development 
Bank, the largest donor to the Caribbean States. During the first twenty years of cooperation, between 
1976 and 1995, financial and technical cooperation reached nearly 1.8 billion euros. For the period of 
the 8th European Development Fund (EDF), assistance programmes have reached nearly 800 million 
euros. Haiti, Suriname, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic were the main beneficiaries. Finally, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom maintain constitutional links with islands that enjoy the status of 
Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs): Anguilla, the Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Montserrat, 
the Turks Islands and Caicos, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. France extends into the region through 
its three overseas departments (DOM): Guadeloupe, Martinique and Guyana. OCTs and DOMs enjoy 
special status within the framework of the European Union.  
True regional economic integration and a specific partnership agreement involving the establishment of 
a free trade area with the Union are on the agenda of CARIFORUM annual meetings with the European 
Commission. Real negotiations to achieve this could start in 2003.  
The European Union has developed decentralised regional programmes to carry out specific actions, 
outside of government relations, with certain categories of well-defined operators. The search for direct 
contact with these entities is not unique to Latin America; the same types of actions are also carried out 
in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership of the Barcelona Process.  
AL-Invest brings together SMEs from Europe and Latin America to strengthen their trade and possibly 
enter into joint ventures. ALFA is intended to finance inter-university exchanges of students, professors 
and researchers. ARB-AL aims to establish direct links between European and Latin American cities and 
regions on the basis of joint projects in urban planning, the environment, technical services, social 
policies and the fight against drugs. ALURE facilitates and encourages the best use of energy by bringing 
together the different operators involved. ALIS, the latest, is expected to come into force in 2002 to 
promote the use of new information technologies. It should allow exchanges to improve communication 
infrastructures, training in the fields of tele-education, health and urban transport, and the creation of 
interconnections between researchers and teachers.  
In 1986, the Governments of South America and Mexico established an informal political dialogue with 
each other: the Rio Group. As early as 1987, the Foreign Ministers of the European Community met 
annually with their colleagues from this group, usually on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in 
New York. This annual dialogue was institutionalised at the Rome Declaration on 20 December 1990, 
recognising that the Rio Group represents the largest forum for dialogue in Latin America. Each of the 
ministerial meetings has adopted a bi-regional cooperation theme each year. On 28 and 29 June 1999 
the first summit of Heads of State and Government of the Union, Latin American and Caribbean 
countries was held in Rio de Janeiro. This first summit was organised around three axes:  
9 
 
- the political dialogue on the reinforcement of the democracy, the reform of the United Nations, the 
fight against drugs and against poverty (Latin America is always the first world producer of cocaine, 
heroin and marijuana);  
- economic and trade issues, faced with the challenge of globalisation;  
- cultural issues and civil society.  
The Summit drafted an action plan and tasked a bi-regional group of senior officials to select, under the 
Finnish presidency, in November 1999, eleven priorities: they focus on consultation, human rights, the 
status of women, the environment, drugs, financial aid, SMEs, education, culture, the information 
society and training. The 9th Ministerial Meeting was held in Vilamoura on 24 February 2000, and the 
10th in Santiago, Chile, on 28 March 2001. Ministers said that globalisation widened the gap between 
industrialised and developing countries. They agreed to halve poverty in Latin America by 2015, 
confirmed that the 2nd Summit of Heads of State will be held in Madrid on 17 and 18 May 2002, and 
that Greece will hold the 11th Ministerial Meeting in 2003.  
The European Commission will prepare a Communication for Heads of State ahead of the Madrid 
Summit, based on the progress made under the priorities. It can be expected that it mainly focuses on 
three of them: the protection of human rights, promotion of the information society and reducing 
poverty.  
With the return of democratic regimes almost everywhere in Latin America, the trend towards sub-
regional groupings to face international competition seems irreversible. But the political will of all 
partners is neither equal nor constant. Some attempts at regrouping take years to produce their first 
effects: this is the case of the Andean Group. The most promising of these groups is certainly Mercosur, 
even if the financial crisis in which Argentina sinks will lead to delays. The four Southern Cone countries 
have developed an ambitious Customs Union project based on the early European model, but driven by 
close political dialogue. For these reasons, the chances of creating a strong partnership between the two 
customs unions, Mercosur and the EU, will be the strongest around 2005-2006.  
President George W. Bush has clearly understood the danger of this European competition: his 
Administration is working very effectively towards a rapprochement with these countries. Texts for 
future agreements in the framework of the FTAA are already in circulation (the same is true for the texts 
on the future Mercosur-EU partnership). However, he is reluctant to rescue Argentina with the help of 
the IMF and the World Bank. However, a succession of bilateral agreements between the Latin American 
countries and the United States would lead to the economic balkanisation of the South of the Americas. 
The supporters of Mercosur have guessed it and fear their own disintegration. Without rejecting the 
FTAA altogether - Argentina, with its financial crisis, cannot help but support and strengthen its ties with 
the United States - Mercosur's political leaders want to push both their own integration (planned for 
2006) and the partnership with, which is their main trading partner and private investor. Of the 25 
largest foreign companies in Mercosur, 14 are European and 11 are American. This is also the reason for 
Chile's ambiguous attitude, which strikes both the doors of NAFTA, hoping to reap the same benefits as 
Mexico, to that of Mercosur, so as not to miss this integration of economies. neighbouring countries to 
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the Union, for broad partnership and for good measure, and to those of APEC, in the distant assumption 
of a successful rapprochement of economies around the Pacific.  
The big unknown lies in the new round of WTO negotiations, launched in Doha in November 2001: will 
multilateralism override regionalism? It is more likely that the Latin American countries will follow these 
two parallel paths hoping, even in the event of a successful Doha Round, to obtain additional benefits in 
bilateral agreements, either with the United States or with Europe, with both. Multinationals and big 
capital are singularly pushing for these multiple solutions. European investors, scalded by their loss of 
market share in Mexico after it turned 85% of its trade to the United States, do not want to miss the 
chance that would open a broad partnership with Mercosur.  
2002 could therefore be a pivotal date in South America's foreign and trade relations: the beginning of 
the new WTO round of negotiations, the acceleration of the US FTAA initiative, and the summit of 
Europe and Latin America, 17 and 18 May 2002, in Madrid. It is reasonable to expect that our Mercosur 
and Chile interlocutors will look to the partnership with Europe as a rebalancing force and to avoid 
dilution in the FTAA. For this reason, the Europeans will try to activate the discussions for the 
partnership with Mercosur, despite the difficulties in Argentina.  
Cuba remains the only country remaining apart from sub-regional groupings. President Bush does not 
give the impression for the moment of wanting to change the American embargo policy, but Senator 
Jesse Helms, fiercely hostile to Castro, has lost the chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the 
Senate, and he has announced that he would not stand in the mid-term elections. Europe can take 
advantage of the situation to improve its relations with Cuban civil society and the nascent private 
sector, if not with its president.  
If both the FTAA (US /Latin America) and the Mercosur-Chile /EU partnership succeed, two sides of the 
US /Mercosur-Chile /EU triangle would have free trade zones by 2010, while the relationship between 
the United States and the Union would remain subject to WTO rules. Supporters of the greater Atlantic 
area of free trade may then argue again to strengthen the relationship of this third side of the square. 
Europe, which is already very much in demand for enlargement to the East and the Doha Round, will 
find it difficult to face all these challenges, unless it regains strong economic growth, which is 
unpredictable today.  
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